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Abstract
”The last remnant of physical objectivity of space-time” is disclosed in the case of a continuous
family of spatially non-compact models of general relativity (GR). The physical individuation of
point-events is furnished by the intrinsic degrees of freedom of the gravitational field, (viz, the Dirac
observables) that represent - as it were - the ontic part of the metric field. The physical role of the
epistemic part (viz. the gauge variables) is likewise clarified. At the end the philosophical import
of the Hole Argument is substantially weakened and in fact the Argument itself dis-solved, while a
peculiar four-dimensional holistic and structuralist view of space-time, (called point-structuralism),
emerges, including elements common to the tradition of both substantivalism and relationism. The
observables of our models undergo real temporal change: this gives new evidence to the fact that
statements like the frozen-time character of evolution, as other ontological claims about GR, are
model dependent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The fact that the requirement of general covariance might involve a threat to the phys-
ical objectivity of the points of space-time as represented by the theory of gravitation was
becoming clear to Einstein even before the theory he was trying to construct was completed.
It was during the years 1913-1915 that the threat took form with the famous Hole Argument
(Lochbetrachtung) (Einstein, 1914) 1. In the literature about classical field theories space-
time points are usually taken to play the role of individuals, but it is often implicit that
they can be distinguished only by the physical fields they carry. Yet, the Hole Argument
apparently forbids precisely this kind of individuation, and since the Argument is a direct
consequence of the general covariance of general relativity (GR), this conflict eventually led
Einstein to state (our emphasis):
That this requirement of general covariance, which takes away from space and
time the last remnant of physical objectivity, is a natural one, will be seen from
the following reflexion... (Einstein, 1916, p.117)
Although Einstein quickly bypassed the seeming cogency of the Hole Argument against
the implementation of general covariance on the purely pragmatic grounds of the so-called
Point-Coincidence Argument2, the issue remained in the background of the theory until the
Hole Argument received new life in recent years with a seminal paper by John Stachel (1980).
This paper, followed seven years later by Earman and Norton’s philosophical argument
against the so-called space-time manifold substantivalism (Earman & Norton, 1987), opened
a rich philosophical debate that is still alive today. The Hole Argument was immediately
regarded by virtually all participants in the debate (Bartels, 1984; Butterfield, 1984, 1987,
1988, 1989; Maudlin, 1988; Rynasiewicz, 1994, 1996) as being intimately tied to the deep
nature of space and time, at least as they are represented by the mathematical models
of GR. It must be acknowledged that until now the debate had a purely philosophical
relevance. From the physicists’ point of view, GR has indeed been immunized against the
Hole Argument - leaving aside any underlying philosophical issue - by simply embodying the
Argument in the statement that mathematically different solutions of the Einstein equations
related by passive - as well as active (see later) - diffeomorphisms are physically equivalent.
The main scope of this paper is to show that the immunization statement quoted above
cannot be regarded as the last word on this matter both from the physical and the philosoph-
ical point of view. From the physical point of view, we will show that physical equivalence of
solutions means much more than mere difference in mathematical description since it entails
equivalence of the descriptions of phenomena made in different global, non-inertial frames,
which are extended space-time laboratories with their (dynamically determined) chrono-
geometrical conventions and inertial potentials. On these same grounds, we will argue from
the philosophical point of view that, first of all, the equivalence statement cannot have the
implications that the Hole Argument has traditionally attributed to it and, second, that the
equivalence does not compels us to take a definite position in front of the crude dichotomy
substantivalism versus relationism; rather we shall show that, for specific models, it leads
1 For a beautiful historical critique see Norton (1987, 1992, 1993).
2 The assertion that the reality of the world-occurrence (in opposition to that dependent on the choice of
reference system) subsists in space-time coincidences.
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naturally to advance a tertium quid between these two positions that tries in some sense
to overcome the crudeness of the debate by including elements common to the traditions
of both substantivalism and relationism3. Third, we shall go beyond the simple statement
of equivalence showing that space-time point-events can be individuated physically by the
intrinsic degrees of freedom of the gravitational field.
It must be clear from the start, however, that, given the enormous mathematical variety
of possible solutions of Einstein’s equations, one should not expect that a clarification of the
possible meaning of a would-be objectivity of space-time points could be obtained in general.
More precisely, we shall indeed conclude that at least three of the main questions we discuss
can be clarified for a definite continuous class of generic solutions corresponding to spatially
non-compact space-times4, but not for the spatially compact ones. The former class is also
privileged from the point of view of the inclusion of elementary particles. Consistently,
we do not claim to draw general conclusions about the ontology of Einstein’s space-times.
While allowing that the ontology of general relativistic space-times can be different for
different models, we only claim that a particular class of solutions exist which naturally
leads to a concept of the space-time ontology consisting in a peculiar form of structural
space-time realism. Our thesis holds that space-time point-events (the relata) do exist and
we quantify over them; their properties are relational being conferred on them in a holistic
way by the whole structure of the metric field and the extrinsic curvature on a simultaneity
hyper-surface. At the same time, they are literally identifiable with the local values of the
intrinsic degrees of freedom of the gravitational field (Dirac observables), and we will claim
that, in a definite abstract sense, they also possess a special kind of intrinsic properties.
In this way both the metric field and the point-events maintain - to paraphrase Newton -
their own manner of existence and we qualify our conception as ”point-structuralism”. Our
view does not dissolve physical entities into mathematical structures, so that it supports a
moderate entity-realist attitude towards both the metric field and its point-events, as well as
a theory-realist attitude towards Einstein’s field equations. In conclusion this work should be
considered as a case study for the defence of a thesis about the nature of the identity of space-
time points characterized by a peculiar form of objectivity. Technically, this philosophical
conclusion is made possible thanks to a specific methodology of gauge-fixing based on the
notion of intrinsic pseudo-coordinates introduced by Bergmann and Komar. It should be
3 The substantivalist position is a form of realism about certain spatiotemporal structures, being committed
to believing in the existence of those entities that are quantified over by our space-time theories, in
particular space-time points. It conceives space-time, more or less, as a substance, that is as something
that exists independently of any of the things in it. Accordingly, the extreme form of substantivalism
identifies space-time with the bare mathematical manifold of events, perhaps as mereological fusion of
all the points. On the other hand, the strong relationist position is the view that space-time arises as a
mere abstraction from the spatiotemporal properties of other things, so that spatio-temporal relations are
derivative and supervenient on physical relations obtaining among events and physical objects. Note that
a simple anti-substantivalist position does not deny the reality of space-time (it is not merely anti-realist)
but asserts that space-time has no reality independently of the bodies of fields it contains. The crucial
question for our notion of spatiotemporal structuralism, is therefore the specification of the nature of fields
that are indispensable for the very definition of physical space-time (e.g. the gravitational field with its
causal structure) as distinguished from other physical fields.
4 The Christodoulou-Klainermann space-times (Christodoulou & Klainermann, 1993).
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stressed that the uniqueness of its mathematical basis (the way in which the four scalar
eigenvalues of the Weyl tensor can be equated to four scalar radar pseudo-coordinates by
means of a definite class of gauge-fixing procedures) shows that this methodology constitutes
the only possible way of disclosing the proper point-events ontology of the class of space-
times we are referring to. For given initial data of the Dirac observables (which identify
an Einstein’s ”universe”), any other kind of gauge-fixing procedure, would lead to gauge-
equivalent solutions in which the underlying point-events ontology simply would not be
shown.
At the technical level, we aim to show that some capabilities peculiar to the Hamilto-
nian approach to GR can be exploited for the purpose of better understanding important
interpretive issues surrounding the theory. The Hamiltonian approach guarantees first of
all that the initial value problem of Einstein’s equations is mathematically well-posed, a
circumstance that does not occur in a natural way within the configurational Lagrangian
framework (Friedrich & Rendall, 2000; Rendall, 1998). Furthermore, on the basis of the
Shanmugadhasan canonical transformation (Shanmugadhasan, 1973; Lusanna, 1993), this
framework provides a net distinction between physical observables (the four so-called Dirac
observables) connected to the (two) intrinsic degrees of freedom of the gravitational field,
on one hand, and gauge variables, on the other. The latter - which express the typical arbi-
trariness of the theory and must be fixed (gauge-fixing) before solving the Einstein equations
for the intrinsic degrees of freedom - turn out to play a fundamental role, no less than the
Dirac observables, in clarifying the real import of the Hole Argument. It will be seen indeed
that the resulting gauge character of GR is a crucial factor not only for clarifying the issue
of the objectivity of space-time points, but also for a true dis-solution of the Hole Argument
as to its philosophical implications5. We stress that reaching these conclusions within the
Lagrangian formulation would be technically quite awkward if not impossible, since the Leg-
endre pull-back of the non-point canonical transformations of the Hamiltonian formulation
requires tools like the infinite-jet bundle formalism.
For the above reasons, the discussion in the following sections will be substantially
grounded upon the fact that GR is a gauge theory, i.e., a theory in which the physical
system being dealt with is described by more variables than there are physically indepen-
dent degrees of freedom. Such extra variables are introduced to make the description more
transparent and mathematically handy but require correspondingly a gauge symmetry hav-
ing the role of extracting the physically relevant content. The important fact in our case is
that while, from the mathematical point of view of the constrained Hamiltonian formalism,
GR is a theory like any other (e.g., electromagnetism and Yang-Mills theory), from the
physical point of view it is radically different, just because of its gauge invariance under a
group of diffeomorphisms acting on space-time itself, instead of invariance under the action
of a local inner Lie group. Furthermore, in GR we cannot rely from the beginning on empir-
ically validated, gauge-invariant dynamical equations for the local fields, as it happens with
electro-magnetism, where Maxwell equations can be written in terms of the gauge invariant
electric and magnetic fields. On the contrary, Einstein’s general covariance (viz. the gauge
5 Our stance about the content and the implications of the original Hole Argument contrasts with the
manifestly covariant and generalized attitude towards the Hole phenomenology expounded by John Stachel
in many papers (see e.g. Stachel & Iftime, 2005, and references therein). We shall defend our approach
in Sections III and VI.
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freedom of GR) is such that the introduction of extra (gauge) variables does indeed make
the mathematical description of general relativity more transparent (through manifest gen-
eral covariance instead of manifest Lorentz covariance) but, at least prima facie, by ruling
out any background structure at the outset, it also makes its physical interpretation more
intriguing, and conceals at the same time the intrinsic properties of point-events. In GR
the distinction between what is observable and what is not, is unavoidably entangled with
the constitution of the very stage, space–time, where the play of physics is enacted: a stage,
however, which also takes an active part in the play. In other words, the gauge-fixing mech-
anism plays the dual role of making the dynamics unique (as in all gauge theories), and
of fixing the appearance of the spatio-temporal dynamical background. At the same time,
this mechanism highlights a characteristic functional split of the metric tensor that can be
briefly described as follows. First of all, any gauge-fixing is equivalent to the constitution
of a global, non-inertial, extended, space-time laboratory with its coordinates, for every τ ,
as well as to a dynamical determination of the conventions about distant simultaneity. In
particular, different conventions within the same space-time (the same ”universe”), turn out
to be simply gauge-related options. Therefore, on one hand, the Dirac observables specify -
as it were - the ontic structure of space-time connected to the intrinsic degrees of freedom
of the gravitational field (and - physically - to tidal-like effects). On the other, the gauge
variables specify the built-in epistemic component6 of the metric tensor (physically related
to the generalized inertial effects accessible in each extended laboratory)7
Summarizing, the gauge variables play a multiple role in completing the structural prop-
erties of the general-relativistic space-time: their fixing is necessary for solving Einstein’s
equations, for reconstructing the four-dimensional chrono-geometry emerging from the initial
values of the four Dirac observables and for allowing empirical access to the theory through
the definition of a spatiotemporal laboratory. It’s important to stress in this connection
that in GR, unlike in ordinary gauge theories, the reduced phase space Ω˜4 of the abstract
observables (a realization of which is created by every gauge fixing) plays an abstract role,
since the inertial effects associated to each NIF are lost because of the quotient procedure
(see Sections IV,V,VI).
Apart from the dis-solution of the Hole Argument, which is expounded in Section III,
the main result of our analysis is given in Section V where we show how the ontic part of
the metric (the intrinsic degrees of freedom of the gravitational field) may confer a physical
6 In this paper ontic refers to the essential content of the gravitational field qua physical entity with two
independent degrees of freedom, epistemic to that part of the information encoded in the metric that
must be freely specified in order to get empirical access to the essential part (it refers therefore to the
it appearance of the gravitational phenomena). We are perfectly aware that we are here overstating the
philosophical import of terms like ontic and epistemic and their relationships. Nothing, however, hinges
on these nuances in what follows.
7 Such a global, extended laboratory is a non-rigid, non-inertial frame (the only existing in GR) centered
on the (in general) accelerated observer whose world-line is the origin of the 3-coordinates (Lusanna &
Pauri, 2004a): hereafter it will be denoted by the acronym NIF. Any NIF is the result of a complete
gauge-fixing (see Section IV). The gauge-fixing procedure determines the appearance of phenomena by
determining uniquely the form of the inertial forces (Coriolis, Jacobi, centrifugal,...) in each point of a
NIF. A crucial difference of this mechanism in GR with respect to the Newtonian case is the fact that the
inertial potentials depend upon tidal effects, besides the coordinates of the non-inertial frame.
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individuation onto space-time points8. Since - as will be seen - such degrees of freedom
depend in a highly non-local way upon the values of the metric and the extrinsic curvature
over a whole space-like surface of distant simultaneity, point-events receive a peculiar sort
of properties that are conferred on them holistically by the whole simultaneous metrical
structure. Admittedly, the distinction between ontic and epistemic parts, as well as the
form of the space-like surfaces of distant simultaneity, are NIF-dependent9.
Finally, an additional important feature of the solutions of GR dealt with in our discussion
is the following. The ADM formalism (Arnowitt & Deser & Misner, 1962) for spatially
compact space-times without boundary implies that the Dirac Hamiltonian generates purely
harmless gauge transformations, so that, being zero on the reduced phase space, it cannot
engender any real temporal change. This is the origin of the so-called frozen evolution
description; in this connection see Earman (2002), Belot & Earman (1999, 2001). However,
in the case of the Christodoulou - Klainermann continuous family of spatially non-compact
space-times, internal mathematical consistency (requiring the addition of the DeWitt surface
term to the Hamiltonian (DeWitt, 1967), see later) entails that the generator of temporal
evolution, namely the (now non-weakly vanishing) Dirac Hamiltonian, be instead the so-
called weak ADM energy. This quantity does generate real temporal modifications of the
canonical variables. In conclusion, this shows again that also statements like the assertion
of the frozen-time picture of evolution, as other ontological claims about GR, are model
dependent.
The main part of the technical developments underlying this work have already been
introduced elsewhere (Pauri & Vallisneri, 2002, Lusanna & Pauri, 2004a, 2004b;) where
additional properties of the Christodoulou-Klainermann family of space-times are also dis-
cussed. For a more general philosophical presentation, see Dorato & Pauri (2004).
II. NOETHER AND DYNAMICAL SYMMETRIES
Standard general covariance, which essentially amounts to the statement that the Ein-
stein equations for the metric field 4g(x) have a tensor character, implies first of all that
the basic equations are form invariant under general coordinate transformations (passive
diffeomorphisms), so that the Lagrangian density in the Einstein-Hilbert action is singular.
Namely, passive diffeomorphisms are local Noether symmetries of the action, so that Dirac
constraints appear correspondingly in the Hamiltonian formulation. The singular nature of
the variational principle of the action entails in turn that four of the Einstein equations be in
fact Lagrangian constraints, namely restrictions on the Cauchy data, while four combinations
of Einstein’s equations and their gradients vanish identically (contracted Bianchi identities).
Thus, the ten components of the solution 4gµν(x) are in fact functionals of only two ”de-
8 There is an unfortunate ambiguity in the usage of the term space-time points in the literature: sometimes
it refers to elements of the mathematical structure that is the first layer of the space-time model, and
sometimes to the points interpreted as physical events. We will adopt the term point–event in the latter
sense and simply point in the former.
9 Yet, according to a main conjecture we have advanced elsewhere (see Lusanna & Pauri, 2004a, 2004b),
a canonical basis of scalars (coordinate-independent quantities), or at least a Poisson algebra of them,
should exist, making the above distinction between Dirac observables and gauge variables fully invariant,
see Section VI and footnote 32.
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terministic” dynamical degrees of freedom and eight further degrees of freedom which are
left completely undetermined by Einstein’s equations even once the Lagrangian constraints
are satisfied. This state of affairs makes the treatment of both the Cauchy problem of the
non-hyperbolic system of Einstein’s equations and the definition of observables within the
Lagrangian context (Friedrich & Rendall, 2000; Rendall, 1998) extremely complicated.
For the above reasons, standard general covariance is then interpreted, in modern termi-
nology, as the statement that a physical solution of Einstein’s equations properly corresponds
to a 4-geometry, namely the equivalence class of all the 4-metric tensors, solutions of the
equations, written in all possible 4-coordinate systems. This equivalence class is usually
represented by the quotient 4Geom = 4Riem/PDiff M
4, where 4Riem denotes the space
of metric tensor solutions of Einstein’s equations and PDiff is the infinite group of pas-
sive diffeomorphisms (general coordinate transformations). On the other hand, any two
inequivalent Einstein space-times are different 4-geometries or ”universes”.
Consider now the abstract differential-geometric concept of active diffeomorphism DA
and its consequent action on the tensor fields defined on the differentiable manifoldM4 [see,
for example, (Wald, 1984, pp.438-439)]. An active diffeomorphism DA maps points ofM
4 to
points of M4: DA : p→ p
′ = DA · p. Its tangent map D
∗
A maps tensor fields T→ DA∗ ·T in
such a way that [T ](p)→ [D∗A ·T ](p) ≡ [T
′
](p). Then [D∗A ·T ](p) = [T ](D
−1
A ·p). It is seen that
the transformed tensor field D∗A · T is a new tensor field whose components in general will
have at p values that are different from those of the components of T . On the other hand,
the components of D∗A ·T have at p
′ - by construction - the same values that the components
of the original tensor field T have at p: T
′
(DA · p) = T (p) or T
′(p) = T (D−1A · p). The new
tensor field D∗A · T is called the drag-along (or push-forward) of T . There is another, non-
geometrical - so-called dual - way of looking at the active diffeomorphisms (Norton, 1987).
This duality is based on the circumstance that in each region of M4 covered by two or more
charts there is a one-to-one correspondence between an active diffeomorphism and a specific
coordinate transformation. The coordinate transformation TDA : x(p)→ x
′(p) = [TDAx](p)
which is dual to the active diffeomorphism DA is defined so that [TDAx](DA · p) = x(p).
Essentially, this duality transfers the functional dependence of the new tensor field in the
new coordinate system to the old system of coordinates. By analogy, the coordinates of the
new system [x′] are said to have been dragged-along with the active diffeomorphism DA. It
is important to note here, however, that the above dual view of active diffeomorphisms, as
particular coordinate-transformations, is defined for the moment only implicitly.
In the abstract coordinate-independent language of differential geometry, Einstein’s equa-
tions for the vacuum
4Gµν(x)
def
= 4Rµν(x)−
1
2
4R(x) 4gµν(x) = 0. (2.1)
can be written as G = 0, where G is the Einstein 2-tensor (G = Gµν(x) dx
µ
⊗
dxν in the
coordinate chart xµ). Under an active diffeomorphism DA : M
4 7→ M4, DA ∈ ADiff M
4,
we have G = 0 7→ D∗AG = 0, which shows that active diffeomorphisms are dynamical
symmetries of the Einstein’s tensor equations, i.e., they map solutions into solutions.
We have clarified elsewhere (Lusanna & Pauri, 2004a) the explicit relationships10 existing
between passive and active diffeomorphisms on the basis of an important paper by Bergmann
10 At least for the infinitesimal active transformations.
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and Komar (1972) in which it is shown that the largest group of passive dynamical symme-
tries of Einstein’s equations is not PDiff M
4 [x
′ µ = fµ(xν)] but instead a larger group of
transformations of the form
Q : x
′ µ = fµ(xν , 4gαβ(x)),
4g
′
µν(x
′
(x)) =
∂hα(x
′
, 4g
′
(x
′
))
∂x′ µ
∂hβ(x
′
, 4g
′
(x
′
))
∂x′ ν
4gαβ(x). (2.2)
In the case of completely Liouville-integrable systems, dynamical symmetries can be re-
interpreted as maps of the space of Cauchy data onto itself. Although we don’t have a general
proof of the integrability of Einstein’s equations, we know that if the initial value problem is
well-posed and defined11, as it is in the ADM Hamiltonian description, the space of Cauchy
data is partitioned in gauge-equivalent classes of data: all of the Cauchy data in a given
class identify a single 4-geometry or ”universe”. Therefore, under the given hypothesis, the
dynamical symmetries of Einstein’s equations fall in two classes only: a) those mapping dif-
ferent ”universes” among themselves, and b) those acting within a single Einstein ”universe”,
mapping gauge-equivalent Cauchy data among themselves. It is remarkable that, at least
for the subset Q′ ⊂ Q (passive counterpart of a subset ADiff
′
M4 ⊂ ADiff M
4) that corre-
sponds to mappings among gauge-equivalent Cauchy data, the transformed metrics do indeed
11 It is important to stress that in looking for global solutions of Einstein’s equations as a system of partial
differential equations, a number of preliminary specifications must be given. Among other things: a) the
topology of space-time; b) whether the space-time is spatially-compact or asymptotically flat at spatial
infinity; c) whether or not in the spatially-compact case there is a spatial boundary; d) the nature of the
function space and the class of boundary conditions, either at spatial infinity or on the spatial boundary,
for the 4-metric and its derivatives (only in the spatially-compact case without boundary there is no
need of boundary conditions, replaced by periodicity conditions, so that these models of GR show the
well-known Machian aspects which influenced Einstein and Wheeler). After these specifications have been
made, a model of GR is identified. What remains to be worked out is the characterization of a well-posed
initial value problem. Modulo technicalities, this requires choosing a 4-coordinate system and finding
which combinations of the equations are of elliptic type (restrictions on the Cauchy data) and which are
of hyperbolic type (evolution equations), namely the only ones requiring an initial value problem. At
the Hamiltonian level, the elliptic equations are the first-class constraints identifying the constraint sub-
manifold of phase space (see Section IV), while the hyperbolic equations are the Hamilton equations in
a fixed gauge (a completely fixed Hamiltonian gauge corresponds on-shell to a 4-coordinate system, see
Section IV). When the gauge variables can be separated from the Dirac observables, only the latter need
an initial value problem (the gauge variables are arbitrary, modulo restrictions upon their range coming
from the structure of the gauge orbits inside the constraint sub-manifold). Finally, given a space-like
Cauchy surface in a 4-coordinate system (or in a fixed Hamiltonian gauge), each admissible set of Cauchy
data gives rise to a different ”universe” with the given boundary conditions. Clearly, each universe is
defined modulo passive diffeomorphisms changing both the 4-coordinate system and the Cauchy surface
(or modulo the Hamiltonian gauge transformations changing the gauge and the Cauchy surface) and also
modulo the (on-shell) active diffeomorphisms.
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belong to the same 4-geometry, i.e. the same equivalence class generated by applying all pas-
sive diffeomorphisms to the original 4-metrics: 4Geom = 4Riem/PDiff M
4 = 4Riem/Q′12.
Note finally that: a) an explicit passive representation of the infinite group of ADiff M
4
is necessary anyway for our Hamiltonian treatment of the Hole Argument as well as for
any comparison of the various viewpoints existing in the literature concerning the solutions
of Einstein’s equations; b) the group Q′ describes the dynamical symmetries of Einstein’s
equations which are also local Noether symmetries of the Einstein-Hilbert action. The 4-
metrics reached by using passive diffeomorphisms are, as it were, only a dense sub-set of the
metrics obtainable by means of the group Q.
In conclusion, what is known as a 4-geometry, is also an equivalence class of solutions of
Einstein’s equations modulo the subset of dynamical symmetry transformations ADiff
′M4,
whose passive counterpart is Q
′
. Therefore, following Bergmann & Komar (1972), Wald
(1984), we can state 13
4Geom = 4Riem/PDiff M
4 = 4Riem/Q′ = 4Riem/ADiff
′M4. (2.3)
III. THE HOLE ARGUMENT AND ITS DIS-SOLUTION
Although the issue could not be completely clear to Einstein in 1916, as shown by Norton
(1987, 1992, 1993), it is precisely the nature of dynamical symmetry of the active diffeo-
morphisms that has been considered as expressing the physically relevant content of general
covariance, as we shall presently see.
Remember, first of all that a mathematical model of GR is specified by a four-dimensional
mathematical manifold M4 and by a metrical tensor field g, where the latter represents both
the chrono-geometrical structure of space-time and the potential for the inertial-gravitational
field. Non-gravitational physical fields, when they are present, are also described by dynam-
ical tensor fields, which appear to be sources of the Einstein equations. Assume now that
M4 contains a holeH: that is, an open region where all the non-gravitational fields vanish so
that the metric obeys the homogeneous Einstein equations. On M4 we can define an active
diffeomorphism D∗A that re-maps the points inside H, but blends smoothly into the identity
map outside H and on the boundary. By construction, for any point x ∈ H we have (in the
12 Note, incidentally, that this circumstance is mathematically possible only because PDiff M
4 is a non-
normal dense sub-group of Q
′
.
13 Eqs.(2.3) are usually taken for granted in mathematical physics, at least at the heuristic level. Since,
however, the control in large of the group manifold of infinite-dimensional groups like PDiff M
4 and
Q
′
is, as yet, an open mathematical issue, one cannot be more rigorous on this point: see also the end
of Section III. For more details about these issues, the interested reader should see Lusanna & Pauri
(2004a, 2004b) where a new subset Qcan of Q is introduced, namely the Legendre pullback of the on-
shell Hamiltonian canonical transformations. We distinguish off-shell considerations, made within the
variational framework before restricting to the dynamical solutions, from on-shell considerations, made
after such a restriction. In (Lusanna & Pauri, 2004a and 2004b) it is shown, for instance, that we have
also 4Geom = 4Riem/Qcan, since, modulo technicalities, we have Qcan = Q
′. Note that PDiff M
4∩Qcan
are the passive diffeomorphisms which are re-interpretable as Hamiltonian gauge transformations.
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abstract tensor notation) g′(DAx) = g(x), but of course g
′(x) 6= g(x) (in the same notation).
The crucial fact is that from the general covariance of Einstein’s equations it follows that if
g is one of their solutions, so is the drag-along field g′ ≡ D∗Ag.
What is the correct interpretation of the new field g′? Clearly, the transformation involves
an active redistribution of the metric over the points of the manifold in H, so the critical
question is whether and how the points of the manifold are primarily individuated. Now,
if we think of the points of H as intrinsically individuated physical events, where intrinsic
means that their identity is autonomous and independent of any physical field, the metric
in particular - a claim that is associated with any kind of manifold substantivalism - then
g and g′ must be regarded as physically distinct solutions of the Einstein equations (after
all, g′(x) 6= g(x) at the same point x). This appears as a devastating conclusion for the
causality, or better, the determinateness14 of the theory, because it implies that, even after
we specify a physical solution for the gravitational and non-gravitational fields outside the
hole - in particular, on a Cauchy surface for the initial value problem - we are still unable
to predict a unique physical solution within the hole.
According to Earman and Norton (1987), the way out of the Hole Argument lies in
abandoning manifold substantivalism: they claim that if diffeomorphically-related metric
fields were to represent different physically possible ”universes”, then GR would turn into
an indeterministic theory. And since the issue of whether determinism holds or not at
the physical level cannot be decided by opting for a metaphysical doctrine like manifold
substantivalism, they conclude that one should refute any kind of such substantivalism.
Since, however, relationism does not amount to the mere negation of substantivalism, and
since the literature contains so many conflicting usages of the term ”relationism”, they do
not simply conclude that space-time is relational. They state the more general assumption
(which - they claim - is applicable to all space-time theories) that ”diffeomorphic models
in a space-time theory represent the same physical situation”. i.e. must be interpreted as
describing the same ”universe” (Leibniz equivalence).
The fact that the Leibniz equivalence seems here no more than a sophisticated re-phrasing
of what physicists consider a foregone conclusion for general relativity, should not be taken
at face value, for the real question for the opposing ”sensible substantivalist” is whether or
not space-time should be simply identified with the bare manifold deprived of any physical
field, and of the metric field in particular, as Earman and Norton do, instead of with a set of
points each endowed with its own metrical fingerprint15. Actually, this substantivalist could
sustain the conviction - as we ourselves do - that the metric field, because of its basic causal
structure, has ontological priority (Pauri, 1996) over all other fields and, therefore, it is not
like any other field, as Earman and Norton would have it. And, according to this view, as
we shall presently see, Leibniz equivalence is not the last word on the issue 16.
14 We prefer to avoid the term determinism, because we believe that its metaphysical flavor tends to overstate
the issue at stake. This is especially true if determinism is taken in opposition to indeterminism, which
is not mere absence of determinism. We are concerned here with the question of being determinate or
under-determinate, referred to solutions of Einstein’s equations.
15 See, for example, Bartels (1994) and Maudlin (1988).
16 Let us recall that already in 1984 Michael Friedman was lucidly aware of the unsatisfactory status of
the understanding of the relation between diffeomorphic models in terms of Leibniz equivalence, when
he wrote (our emphasis) ”Further, if the above models are indeed equivalent representations of the same
situation (as it would seem they must do) then how do we describe this physical situation intrinsically?.
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We do believe that the bare manifold of points, deprived of the infinitesimal pythagorean
structure defining the basic distinction between temporal and spatial directions, let alone
the causal structure which teach all the other fields how to move, can hardly be seen as
space-time. Consequently, and in agreement with Stachel (1993), we believe that asserting
that g and D∗Ag represent one and the same gravitational field implies that the mathematical
individuation of the points of the differentiable manifold by their coordinates has no physical
content until a metric tensor is specified 17. Stachel stresses that if g and D∗Ag must represent
the same gravitational field, they cannot be physically distinguished in any way. Accordingly,
when we act on g with D∗A to create the drag-along field D
∗
Ag, no element of physical
significance can be left behind: in particular, nothing that could identify a point x of the
manifold itself as the same point of space-time for both g and D∗Ag. Instead, when x is
mapped onto x′ = D∗Ax, it carries over its identity, as specified by g
′(x′) = g(x). This
means, for one thing, that ”the last remnant of physical objectivity” of space-time points,
if any, should be sought for in the physical content of the metric field itself.
These remarks led Stachel to the important conclusion that vis a´ vis the physical point-
events, the metric actually plays the role of individuating field. Precisely, Stachel suggested
that this individuating role could be implemented by four invariant functionals of the metric,
which Komar and Bergmann (Komar 1958; Bergmann & Komar, 1960) had already consid-
ered. Stachel, however, did not follow up on this proposal by providing a concrete realization
in terms of solutions of Einstein’s equations, something that we instead will presently do.
At the same time we will show in Section VI that Stachel’s suggestion, as it stands, remains
at a too abstract level and fails to exploit the crucial distinction between ontic and arbi-
trary epistemic content of the Bergmann-Komar invariant functionals of the metric, that is
necessary to specify the solutions they apply to.
We conclude this Section by summarizing the implications of our analysis about the
meaning and the philosophical import of the Hole Argument. The force of the indeterminacy
argument apparently rests on the following basic facts: (i) a solution of Einstein’s equations
must be preliminarily individuated outside (and, of course, inside) the Hole, otherwise there
would be no meat for the Argument itself. Although the original formulation of the Hole
Argument, as well as many subsequent expositions of it, are silent on this point, we will see
that the Hole Argument is unavoidably entangled with the initial value problem 18; (ii) the
active diffeomorphism D∗A, which is purportedly chosen to be the identity outside the hole
H, is a dynamical symmetry of Einstein’s equations, so that it maps solutions into solutions,
equivalent (as 4-geometries or Einstein ”universes”) or not ; (iii) since D∗A is, by hypothesis,
the identity on the Cauchy hyper-surface, it cannot map a solution defining a given Einstein
Finding such an intrinsic characterization (avoiding quantification over bare points) appears to be a non-
trivial, and so far unsolved mathematical problem. (Note that it will not do simply to replace points with
equivalence classes of points: for, in many cases, the equivalence class in question will contain all points
of the manifold)”, see Friedman, (1984).
17 Coordinatization is the only way to individuate the points mathematically since, as stressed by Hermann
Weyl: ”There is no distinguishing objective property by which one could tell apart one point from all
others in a homogeneous space: at this level, fixation of a point is possible only by a demonstrative act
as indicated by terms like this and there.” (Weyl. 1946, p. 13). See also Schlick, (1917), quoted in
M.Friedman, (2003), p.165.
18 It is interesting to find that David Hilbert stressed this point already in 1917 (Hilbert, 1917).
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”universe” into a different ”universe”, which would necessarily correspond to inequivalent
Cauchy data; but (iv) nevertheless, we are told by the Hole Argument that D∗A engenders a
”different” solution inside the Hole.
Actually, in spite of the prima facie geometric obviousness of the identity condition
required for D∗A outside the Hole, it is quite illusory trying to explain all the facets of
the relations of the Argument with the initial value problem in the purely abstract way of
differential geometry. The point is that the differential-geometric 4-D formulation cannot
exploit the advantage that the Hamiltonian formulation possess of working off-shell (i.e.
before going onto solutions of the Hamilton equations: see footnote 13). This is crucial
since in the present context the 4-D active diffeomorphisms - qua dynamical symmetries of
Einstein’s equations - must be directly applied on solutions of GR. These solutions, however,
cannot be exaustively managed in the 4-D configurational approach in terms of initial data
because of the non-hyperbolicity of Einstein’s equations. The Hole Argument needs that
the Cauchy problem be formulated outside the Hole explicitly and in advance, a fact that
requires abandoning the Lagrangian way in favor of Hamiltonian methods. At this point,
the results of the previous Section (the passive counterpart of D∗A must belong to Q
′, or
belong to Q but not to Q′) leave us with the sole option that, once rephrased in the passive
Hamiltonian language, the active diffeomorphism D∗A exploited by the Argument must lie
in the subset Q′ (ADiff
′
M4). But, then, it must necessarily map Cauchy data into gauge-
equivalent Cauchy data, precisely those gauge-equivalent data that generate the allegedly
”different” solution within the Hole. In the end, the ”difference” turn out to correspond
to a mere different choice of the gauge for the same solution. Thus Leibniz equivalence
boils down to mere gauge equivalence in its strict sense19, an effect that - for what said
above - cannot be transparently displayed in the configurational geometric description. On
the other hand, were the active diffeomorphism D∗A, once passively rephrased, to belong to
the group Q but not to the subset Q
′
(i.e., were it originally lying in ADiff M
4, but not
in ADiff
′
M4)), then it would not correspond to a mere gauge equivalence and it would
necessarily modify the Cauchy data outside the Hole. Therefore it would lead to a really
different Einstein ”universe” but it would violate the assumption of the Hole Argument
that D∗A be the identity on the Cauchy hyper-surface. In any case, it is seen that the
disappearance of the ”indeterminacy” rests upon the necessity of formulating the Cauchy
problem before talking about the relevant properties of the solutions.
We conclude that - to the extent that the Cauchy problem is well-posed, i.e. in every
globally hyperbolic space-time and not necessarily in our class only - exploiting the original
Hole Argument to the effect of asking ontological questions about the general relativistic
space-time is an enterprise devoid of real philosophical impact, in particular concerning the
menace of indeterminism. There is clearly no room left for upholding manifold substanti-
valism, ”different worlds”, ”metric essentialism” or any other metaphysical doctrine about
space-time points in the face of the Hole Argument. Of course, such metaphysical doctrines
can still be defended, yet independently of the Hole story. The Hole Argument maintains
nevertheless an interesting open question regarding the issue of the physical (viz. dynamical)
individuation of the point-events of M4 (see Section V).
19 The physical meaning of this equivalence will be clarified in Section IV.
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IV. THE CHRISTODOULOU-KLAINERMANN SPACE-TIMES, 3+1 SPLIT-
TING, AND ADM CANONICAL REDUCTION
The Christodoulou-Klainermann space-times are a continuous family of space-times that
are non-compact, globally hyperbolic, asymptotically flat at spatial infinity (asymptotic
Minkowski metric, with asymptotic Poincare´ symmetry group) and topologically trivial
(M4 ≡ R3 ×R), supporting global 4-coordinate systems.
The ADM Hamiltonian approach starts with a 3+1 splitting of the 4-dimensional mani-
fold M4 into constant-time hyper-surfaces Στ ≡ R
3, indexed by the parameter time τ , each
equipped with coordinates σa (a = 1,2,3) and a three-metric 3g (in components 3gab). The
parameter time τ and the coordinates σa (a = 1,2,3) are in fact Lorentz-scalar, radar co-
ordinates adapted to the 3+1 splitting (Alba & Lusanna, 2003, 2005a). They are defined
with respect to an arbitrary observer, a centroid Xµ(τ), chosen as origin, whose proper
time may be used as the parameter τ labelling the hyper-surfaces. On each hyper-surface
all the clocks are conventionally synchronized to the value τ . Note that such coordinates
are intrinsically frame-dependent since they parametrize a NIF centered on the arbitrary
observer. The simultaneity (and Cauchy) hyper-surfaces Στ are described by the embedding
functions xµ = zµ(τ, σa) = Xµ(τ) + F µ(τ, σa), F µ(τ, 0a) = 0 20.
An important point to be kept in mind is that the explicit functional form of embedding
functions and - consequently - of the geometry of the 3 + 1 splitting of M4, thought to be
implicitly given at the outset, remains arbitrary until the solution of Einstein’s equations is
worked out in a fixed gauge: see later.
Now, start at a point on Στ , and displace it infinitesimally in a direction that is normal
to Στ . The resulting change in τ can be written as △ τ = Ndτ , where N is the so-called
lapse function. Moreover, the time displacement dτ will also shift the spatial coordinates:
σa(τ + dτ) = σa(τ) +Nadτ , where Na is the shift vector. Then the interval between (τ, σa)
and (τ +dτ, σa+dσa) is: ds2 = N2dτ 2− 3gab(dσ
a+Nadτ)(dσb+N bdτ). The configurational
variables N , Na, 3gab (replacing the 4-metric g) together with their 10 conjugate momenta,
index a 20-dimensional phase space21. Expressed (modulo surface terms) in terms of the
ADM variables, the Einstein-Hilbert action is a function of N , Na, 3gab and their first
time-derivatives, or equivalently of N , Na, 3gab and the extrinsic curvature
3Kab of the
hyper-surface Στ , considered as an embedded manifold.
Since Einstein’s original equations are not hyperbolic, it turns out that the canonical
momenta are not all functionally independent, but satisfy four conditions known as primary
constraints (they are given by the vanishing of the lapse and shift canonical momenta).
Another four, secondary constraints, arise when we require that the primary constraints
be preserved through evolution (the secondary constraints are called the super-hamiltonian
H0 ≈ 0, and the super-momentum Ha ≈ 0, (a = 1, 2, 3) constraints, respectively). The
20 Let us stress that the radar-coordinates are not ordinary coordinates xµ in a chart of the Atlas A of
M4. They should be properly called pseudo-coordinates in a chart of the Atlas A˜ defined by adding to
M4 the extra-structure of all its admissible 3+1 splittings: actually the new coordinates are adapted to
this extra-structure. If the embedding of the constant-time hyper-surfaces Στ of a 3+1 splitting into M
4
is described by the functions zµ(τ, σa), then the transition functions from the adapted radar-coordinates
σA = (τ ;σa) to the ordinary coordinates are
∂zµ(τ, σa)
∂σA
.
21 Of course, all these variables are in fact fields.
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eight constraints are given as functions of the canonical variables that vanish on the con-
straint surface. The existence of such constraints implies that not all the points of the
20-dimensional phase space represent physically meaningful states: rather, we are restricted
to the constraint surface where all the constraints are satisfied, i.e., to a 12-dimensional (20 -
8) surface which, however, does not possess the geometrical structure of a true phase space.
When used as generators of canonical transformations, the eight constraints map points on
the constraint surface to points on the same surface; these transformations are known as
gauge transformations.
To obtain the correct dynamics for the constrained system, we must consider the Dirac
Hamiltonian, which is the sum of the DeWitt surface term (DeWitt, 1967) 22 [present only
in spatially non-compact space-times and becoming the ADM energy after suitable manip-
ulations (Lusanna, 2001; DePietri & Lusanna & Martucci & Russo, 2002)], of the secondary
constraints multiplied by the lapse and shift functions, and of the primary constraints mul-
tiplied by arbitrary functions (the so-called Dirac multipliers). If, following Dirac, we make
the reasonable demand that the evolution of all physical variables be unique - otherwise we
would have real physical variables that are indeterminate and therefore neither observable
nor measurable - then the points of the constraint surface lying on the same gauge orbit, i.e.
linked by gauge transformations, must describe the same physical state. Conversely, only
the functions in phase space that are invariant with respect to gauge transformations can
describe physical quantities.
To eliminate this ambiguity and create a one-to-one mapping between points in the phase
space and physical states, we must impose further constraints, known as gauge conditions or
gauge-fixings. The gauge-fixings can be implemented by arbitrary functions of the canonical
variables, except that they must define a reduced phase space that intersects each gauge
orbit exactly once (orbit conditions). The number of independent gauge-fixing must be
equal to the number of independent constraints (i.e. 8 in our case). The canonical reduction
follows a cascade procedure23. Precisely, the gauge-fixings to the super-hamiltonian and
super-momentum come first (call it Γ4): they determine the 3-coordinate system and the
off-shell shape of Στ ; then the requirement of their time constancy fixes the gauges with
respect to the primary constraints: they determine the lapse and shift functions. Finally the
requirement of time constancy for these latter gauge-fixings determines the Dirac multipliers.
Therefore, the first level of gauge-fixing gives rise to a complete gauge-fixing, say Γ8, and is
22 The DeWitt surface term is uniquely determined as the sum of two parts: a) the surface integral to
be extracted from the Einstein-Hilbert action to get the ADM action; b) a surface integral due to an
integration by parts required by the Legendre transformation from the ADM action to phase space [see
(Lusanna, 2001) after Eq.(5.5) and (Hawking & Horowitz, 1996)]. By adding a surface term different from
the ADM one, we would get another action with the same equations of motion but an a-priori different
canonical formulation. Still another option is to consider the metric and the Christoffel connection as
independent configuration variables: this is the first-order Palatini formalism, which has a much larger
gauge freedom including also second class constraints. All these canonical formulations must lead anyway
to the same number of physical degrees of freedom.
23 This procedure is the natural one for systems with first-class constraints, because it avoids mathematical
inconsistencies like instabilities in the pre-symplectic geometric structure. Usually one adds the gauge
fixings to all the constraints without taking this point into consideration, so that, especially in GR, there
is the possibility to get coordinate singularities in a finite time.
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sufficient to remove all the gauge arbitrariness. This is equivalent to the choice of a NIF,
namely, as said in footnote 7, to the determination of the appearances of phenomena in a
global extended laboratory (see later) .
The Γ8 procedure reduces the original 20-dimensional phase space to a copy Ω4 of the
abstract reduced phase-space Ω˜4 having 4 degrees of freedom per point (12 - 8 gauge-fixings).
Abstractly, the reduced phase-space with its symplectic structure is defined by the quotient of
the constraint surface with respect to the 8-dimensional group of gauge transformations and
represents the space of the abstract gauge-invariant observables of GR: two configurational
and two momentum variables. These observables carry the physical content of the theory
in that they represent the intrinsic degrees of freedom of the gravitational field (remember
that at this stage we are dealing with a pure gravitational field without matter).
For any complete gauge Γ8, we get a Γ8-dependent copy Ω4 of the abstract Ω˜4 in terms of
the symplectic structure (Dirac brackets) defined by the given gauge-fixings and coordina-
tized by four Dirac observables [call such field observables qr, ps (r,s = 1,2)]. The functional
form of these Dirac observables (concrete realization of the gauge-invariant abstract observ-
ables in the given complete gauge Γ8) in terms of the original canonical variables depends
upon the chosen gauge, so that such observables - a priori - are neither tensors nor invariant
under PDiff . In each gauge Γ8, the original 8 gauge variables are now uniquely deter-
mined functions of the Dirac observables. Yet, off shell, barring sophisticated mathematical
complications, any two copies of Ω4 are diffeomorphic images of one-another.
It is important to understand qualitatively the geometric meaning of the eight infinites-
imal off-shell Hamiltonian gauge transformations and thereby the geometric significance of
the related gauge-fixings. i) The transformations generated by the four primary constraints
modify the lapse and shift functions which, in turn, determine both how densely the space-
like hyper-surfaces Στ are distributed in space-time and the appearance of gravito-magnetism
on them; ii) the transformations generated by the three super-momentum constraints induce
a transition on Στ from one given 3-coordinate system to another; iii) the transformation
generated by the super-hamiltonian constraint induces a transition from one given a-priori
”form” of the 3+1 splitting of M4 to another (namely, from a given notion of distant si-
multaneity to another), by operating deformations of the space-like hyper-surfaces in the
normal direction.
It should be stressed that the manifest effect of the gauge-fixings related to the above
transformations emerges only at the end of the canonical reduction and after the solution of
the Einstein-Hamilton equations has been worked out (i.e., on shell). This happens because
the role of the gauge-fixings is essentially that of choosing the functional form in which
all the gauge variables depend upon the Dirac observables, i.e. - physically - of fixing the
form of the inertial potentials of the associated NIF. As anticipated in the Introduction, this
important physical aspect is completely lost within the abstract reduced phase space Ω˜4,
which could play, nevertheless, another role (see Sections V and VI).
It is only after the initial conditions for theDirac observables have been arbitrarily selected
on a Cauchy surface that the whole four-dimensional chrono-geometry of the resulting Ein-
stein ”universe” is dynamically determined, including the embedding functions xµ = zµ(τ, ~σ)
(i.e. the on-shell shape of Στ ). In particular, since the transformations generated by the
super-hamiltonian modify the rules for the synchronization of distant clocks, all the rela-
tivistic conventions, associated to the 3 + 1 slicing of M4 in a given Einstein ”universe”,
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turn out to be dynamically-determined, gauge-related options24.
Two important points must be emphasized.
First, in order to carry out the canonical reduction explicitly, before implementing the
gauge-fixings we have to perform a basic canonical transformation at the off-shell level, the
so-called Shanmugadhasan transformation (Shanmugadhasan, 1973; Lusanna, 1993), mov-
ing from the original canonical variables to a new basis including the Dirac observables as a
canonical subset25. It should be stressed here that it is not known whether the Shanmugad-
hasan canonical transformation, and therefore the GR observables, can be defined globally in
Christodoulou - Klainermann space-times. In most of the spatially compact space-times this
cannot be done for topological reasons. A further problem is that in field theory in general
the status of the canonical transformations is still heuristic. Therefore the only tool (viz.
the Shanmugadhasan transformation) we have for a systematic search of GR observables in
every type of space-time is still lacking a rigorous definition. In conclusion, the mathemat-
ical basis of our analysis regarding the objectivity of points is admittedly heuristic, yet our
arguments are certainly no more heuristic than the overwhelming majority of the theoretical
and/or philosophical claims concerning every model of GR.
The Shanmugadhasan transformation is highly non-local in the metric and curvature vari-
ables: although, at the end, for any τ , the Dirac observables are fields indexed by the coor-
dinate point σa, they are in fact highly non-local functionals of the metric and the extrinsic
curvature over the whole off shell surface Στ . We can write, symbolically:
qr(τ, ~σ) = F[Στ ]
r
[
(τ, ~σ)| 3gab,
3πcd
]
ps(τ, ~σ) = G[Στ ]s
[
(τ, ~σ)| 3gab,
3πcd
]
, r, s = 1, 2. (4.1)
Second: since, as mentioned, in spatially compact space-times the original canonical
Hamiltonian in terms of the ADM variables is zero, the Dirac Hamiltonian happens to
be written solely in terms of the eight constraints and Lagrangian multipliers. This means,
however, that this Hamiltonian generates purely harmless gauge transformations, so that it
cannot engender any real temporal change. Therefore, in spatially-compact space-times, in
a completely fixed Hamiltonian gauge we have a vanishing Hamiltonian, and the canonical
Dirac observables are constant of the motion, i.e. τ -independent.
In these models of GR with spatially-compact space-times without boundary (nothing
is known if there is a boundary) there is the problem of re-introducing the appearance
of evolution in a frozen picture. Without entering this debated topic [see the viewpoints
24 Unlike the special relativistic case where the various possible conventions are non-dynamical options.
25 In practice, this transformation is adapted to seven of the eight constraints (Lusanna, 2001; DePietri &
Lusanna & Martucci & Russo, 2002): they are replaced by seven of the new momenta whose conjugate
configuration variables are the gauge variables describing the lapse and shift functions and the choice of
the spatial coordinates on the simultaneity surfaces. The new basis contains the conformal factor (or the
determinant) of the 3-metric, which is determined by the super-hamiltonian constraint (though as yet
no solution has been found for this equation, also called the Lichnerowicz equation), and its conjugate
momentum (the last gauge variable whose variation describes the normal deformations of the simultaneity
surfaces).
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of Earman (2002,2003), Maudlin (2002), Rovelli (1991,2002) as well as the criticisms of
Kuchar (1992,1993) and Unruh (1991)], we only add a remark on the problem of time. In all
the globally hyperbolic space-times (the only ones admitting a canonical formulation) there
is a mathematical time τ , labeling the simultaneity (and Cauchy) surfaces, which has to
be connected to some empirical notion of time (astronomical ephemerides time, laboratory
clock,...). In a GR model with the frozen picture there is no physical Hamiltonian governing
the evolution in τ 26 and an open problem is how to define a local evolution in terms of
a clock built with GR observables (with a time monotonically increasing with τ) and how
to parametrize other GR observables in terms of this clock (see the evolving constants of
motion and the partial and complete observables of Rovelli (1991, 2002), as well as a lot of
different point of views).
Our advantage point, however, is that, in the case of spatially non-compact space-times
such as those we are dealing with in this work, the generator of τ -temporal evolution is
the weak ADM energy27. Indeed, this quantity does generate real τ -temporal modifications
of the canonical variables, which subsequently can be rephrased in terms of some empirical
clock monotonically increasing in τ . It’s important to stress that the density EADM(τ, ~σ) of
the weak ADM energy
∫
d3σEADM(τ, ~σ) is a gauge-dependent quantity since it contains the
potentials of the inertial forces explicitly. This is nothing else than another aspect of the
gauge-dependence problem of the energy density in GR.
Thus, the final Einstein-Dirac-Hamilton equations for the Dirac observables are
q˙r = {qr, HADM}
∗, p˙s = {ps, HADM}
∗, r, s = 1, 2, (4.2)
26 Unless, following Kuchar (1993), one states that the super-Hamiltonian constraint is not a generator of
gauge transformations but an effective Hamiltonian instead.
27 The ADM energy is a Noether constant of motion representing the total mass of the instantaneous 3-
”universe”, just one among the ten asymptotic ADM Poincare’ charges that, due to the absence of
super-translations, are the only asymptotic symmetries existing in Christodoulou-Klainermann space-
times. Consequently, the Cauchy surfaces Στ must tend to space-like hyper-planes, normal to the ADM
momentum, at spatial infinity. This means that: (i) such Στ ’s are the rest frame of the instantaneous
3-”universe”; (ii) asymptotic inertial observers exist and have to be identified with the fixed stars, and (iii)
an asymptotic Minkowski metric is naturally defined. This asymptotic background allows us to avoid a split
of the metric into a background metric plus a perturbation in the weak field approximation (note that our
space-times provide a model of either the solar system or our galaxy but, as yet, not a well-defined model
for cosmology). Finally, if gravity is switched off, the Christodoulou-Klainermann space-times collapse to
Minkowski space-time and the ADM Poincare’ charges become the Poincare’ special relativistic generators.
These space-times provide, therefore, the natural model of GR for incorporating particle physics which,
in every formulation, is a chapter of the theory of representations of the Poincare’ group on Minkowski
space-time in inertial frames, with the elementary particles identified by the mass and spin invariants. If
we change the boundary conditions, allowing the existence of super-translations, the asymptotic ADM
Poincare’ group is enlarged to the infinite-dimensional asymptotic SPI group (Wald, 1984) and we loose
the possibility of defining the spin invariant. Note that in spatially compact space-times with boundary it
could be possible to define a boundary Poincare’ group (lacking in absence of boundary), but we know of
no result about this case. The mathematical background of these results can be found in (Lusanna, 2001;
Lusanna & Russo, 2002; DePietri & Lusanna & Martucci & Russo, 2002; Agresti & DePietri & Lusanna
& Martucci, 2004) and references therein.
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where HADM is intended as the restriction of the weak ADM energy to Ω4 and where the
{·, ·}∗ are the Dirac brackets.
In conclusion, within the Hamiltonian formulation, we found a class of solutions in which
- unlike what has been correctly argued by Earman (Earman, 2002; Belot & Earman, 1999,
2001) for spatially- compact space-times - there is a real, NIF-dependent, temporal change.
But this of course also means that the frozen-time picture, being model dependent, is not a
typical feature of GR.
On the other hand it is not clear whether the formulation of a cosmological model for
GR is necessarily limited to spatially compact space-times without boundary. As already
said, our model is suited for the solar system or the galaxy. It cannot be excluded, however,
that our asymptotic inertial observers (till now identified with the fixed stars) might be
identified with the preferred frame of the cosmic background radiation with our 4-metric
including some pre-asymptotic cosmological term.
V. FINDING THE LAST REMNANT OF PHYSICAL OBJECTIVITY: THE
INTRINSIC GAUGE AND THE DYNAMICAL INDIVIDUATION OF POINT-
EVENTS
We know that only two of the ten components of the metric are physically essential: it
seems plausible then to suppose that only this subset can act as an individuating field, and
that the remaining components play a different role.
Consider the following four scalars invariant functionals (the eigenvalues of the Weyl
tensor), written here in Petrov’s compressed notation:
w1 = Tr (gWgW ),
w2 = Tr (gWǫW ),
w3 = Tr (gWgWgW ),
w4 = Tr (gWgWǫW ), (5.1)
where g is the 4-metric,W is the Weyl tensor, and ǫ is the Levi–Civita totally antisymmetric
tensor.
Bergmann and Komar (Komar, 1958; Bergmann & Komar, 1960; Bergmann, 1961, 1962)
proposed a set of invariant intrinsic pseudo-coordinates as four suitable functions of the wT
28,
Iˆ [A] = Iˆ [A]
[
wT [g(x), ∂g(x)]
]
, A = 0, 1, 2, 3. (5.2)
Indeed, under the hypothesis of no space-time symmetries, the Iˆ [A] can be used to label the
point-events of space-time, at least locally.29 Since they are scalars, the Iˆ [A] are invariant
under passive diffeomorphisms (therefore they do not define a coordinate chart in the usual
sense, precisely as it happens with radar coordinates).
28 Modulo the equations of motion, the eigenvalues wT are functionals of the 4-metric and its first derivatives.
29 Problems might arise if we try to extend the labels to the entire space-time: for instance, the coordinates
might turn out to be multi-valued.
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Clearly, our attempt to use intrinsic coordinates to provide a physical individuation of
point-events would prima facie fail in the presence of symmetries, when the Iˆ [A] become
degenerate. This objection was originally raised by Norton (see Norton, 1988, p.60) as a cri-
tique to manifold-plus-further-structure (MPFS) substantivalism (see for instance Maudlin,
1988, 1990). Several responses are possible. First, although to this day all the known ex-
act solutions of the Einstein equations admit one or more symmetries, these mathematical
models are very idealized and simplified; in a realistic situation (for instance, even with two
masses alone) space-time would be filled with the excitations of the gravitational degrees
of freedom, and would admit no symmetries at all. Second, the parameters of the symme-
try transformations can be used as supplementary individuating fields, since, as noticed by
Stachel (1993), they also depend on metric field, through its isometries. Third, and most
important, in our analysis of the physical individuation of points we are arguing a question of
principle, and therefore we must consider generic solutions of the Einstein equations rather
than the null-measure set of solutions with symmetries.
It turns out that the four Weyl scalar invariants can be re-expressed in terms of the
ADM variables, namely the lapse N and shift Na functions, the 3-metric 3gab and its conju-
gate canonical momentum (the extrinsic curvature 3Ka,b)
30. Consequently the Iˆ [A] can be
exploited to implement four gauge-fixings constraints involving a hyper-surface Στ and its
embedding in M4. On the other hand, in a completely fixed gauge Γ8, the Iˆ
[A] become gauge
dependent functions of the Dirac observables of that gauge.
Writing
Iˆ [A][wT (g, ∂g)] ≡ Zˆ
[A][wˆT (
3g, 3π,N,Na)], A = 0, 1, 2, 3; (5.3)
and selecting a completely arbitrary, radar, pseudo-coordinate system σA ≡ [τ, σa] adapted
to the Στ surfaces, we apply the intrinsic gauge-fixing defined by
χA ≡ σA−Zˆ [A]
[
wˆT [
3g(σB), 3π(σD), N(σE), Na(σF )]
]
≈ 0, A,B,D,E, F = 0, 1, 2, 3; (5.4)
to the super-hamiltonian (A = 0) and the super-momentum (A = 1,2,3) constraints. This is
a good gauge-fixing provided that the functions Zˆ [A] are chosen to satisfy the fundamental
orbit conditions {Zˆ [A],HB} 6= 0, (A,B = 0, 1, 2, 3), which ensure the independence of
the χA and carry information about the Lorentz signature. Then the complete Γ8 intrinsic
gauge-fixing leads to
σA ≡ Z˜ [A][qa(σB), pb(σ
D)|Γ)], A,B,D = 0, 1, 2, 3; a, b = 1, 2; (5.5)
where the notation indexed by |Γ) means the functional form assumed in the chosen gauge
Γ8.
The last equation becomes an identity with respect to the σA, and amounts, on-shell, to
a definition of the radar pseudo-coordinates σA as four scalars providing a physical individu-
ation of any point–event, in the gauge-fixed coordinate system, in terms of the gravitational
degrees of freedom qa and pb. In this way each of the point–events of space-time is en-
dowed with its own metrical fingerprint extracted from the tensor field, i.e., the value of
30 Bergmann and Komar have shown that the four eigenvalues of the spatial part of the Weyl tensor depend
only upon the 3-metric and its conjugate momentum.
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the four scalar functionals of the Dirac observables (exactly four!)31. The price that we
have paid for this achievement is that we have broken general covariance! This, however,
is not a drawback because every choice of 4-coordinates for a point (every gauge-fixing, in
the Hamiltonian language), in any procedure whatsoever for solving Einstein’s equations,
amounts to a breaking of general covariance, by definition. On the other hand the whole
extent of general covariance can be recovered by exploiting the gauge freedom.
Note that our construction does not depend on the selection of a set of physically preferred
intrinsic pseudo-coordinates, because by modifying the functions I [A] we have the possibility
of implementing any (adapted) radar-coordinate system. Passive diffeomorphism-invariance
reappears in a different suit: we find exactly the same functional freedom of PDiff M
4 in
the functional freedom of the choice of the pseudo-coordinates Z [A] (i.e., of the gauge-fixing).
Any adapted radar-coordinatization of the manifold can be seen as embodying the physical
individuation of points, because it can be implemented as the Komar–Bergmann intrinsic
pseudo-coordinates after we choose the correct Z [A] and select the proper gauge.
In conclusion, as soon as the Einstein-Dirac-Hamilton equations are solved in the chosen
gauge Γ8, starting from given initial values of the Dirac observables on a Cauchy hyper-
surface Στ0 , the evolution in τ throughout M
4 of the Dirac observables themselves, whose
dependence on space (and on parameter time) is indexed by the chosen coordinates σA,
yields the following dynamically-determined effects: i) reproduces the σA as the Bergmann-
Komar intrinsic pseudo-coordinates; ii) reconstructs space-time as an (on-shell) foliation of
M4; iii) defines the associated NIF; iv) determines a simultaneity convention.
Now, what happens if matter is present? Matter changes the Weyl tensor through Ein-
stein’s equations and, in the new basis constructed by the Shanmugadhasan transformation,
contributes to the separation of gauge variables from Dirac observables through the presence
of its own Dirac observables. In this case we have Dirac observables for both the gravitational
field and the matter fields, which satisfy coupled Einstein-Dirac-Hamilton equations. Since
the gravitational Dirac observables will still provide the individuating fields for point-events
according to our procedure, matter will come to influence the evolution of the gravitational
Dirac observables and thereby the physical individuation of point-events. Of course, a basic
role of matter is the possibility of building apparatuses for the measurement of the gravita-
tional field, i.e. for an empirical localization of point-events. As shown elsewhere (Pauri &
Vallisneri, 2002, Lusanna & Pauri, 2004a, 2004b), lacking a dynamical theory of measure-
ment, the epistemic circuit of GR can be approximately closed via an experimental three-steps
procedure that, starting from concrete radar measurements and using test-objects, ends up
in a complete and empirically coherent intrinsic individuating gauge fixing. In this way,
the value of the intrinsic coordinates at a point–event can be extracted (in principle) by an
actual experiment designed to measure the wT .
Finally, let us emphasize that, even in the case with matter, time evolution is still ruled
by the weak ADM energy. Therefore, the temporal variation corresponds to a real change
and not merely to a harmless gauge transformation as in other models of GR. The latter in-
clude, as already stressed in Section IV, the spatially compact space-time without boundary
(or simply closed models) which are exploited by Earman (2002). Since in these spatially
31 The fact that there are just four independent invariants for the vacuum gravitational field should not be
regarded as a coincidence. On the contrary, it is crucial for the purpose of point individuation and for the
gauge-fixing procedure we are proposing.
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compact models the Dirac observables of every completely fixed gauge are τ -independent,
the first of the gauge fixings (5.5) is inconsistent: it is impossible to realize the time-direction
in terms of Dirac observables, and the individuation of point-events breaks down. This is
compatible with the Wheeler-DeWitt interpretation according to which we can speak only
of a local time evolution (in the direction normal to Στ ) generated by the super-hamiltonian
constraint [see for instance Kuchar (1993)]: in other words the local evolution would coincide
with a continuous local change of the convention about distant clock synchronization!
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS - I: THE SPACE-TIME PHYSICAL TEXTURE
The main results we have so far obtained are: i) a peculiar dis-solution of the Hole
Argument; ii) a NIF-dependent physical individuation of point-events in terms of the intrin-
sic degrees of freedom of the gravitational field (the essential metrical fingerprint we were
looking for); iii) a NIF-dependent temporal evolution of the physical observables.
While the first claim is asserted for every globally-hyperbolic space-time, the other results
are valid with reference to the particular spatially non-compact models of GR we have chosen.
In this Section we want to summarize the main features of these three issues and devote
a final Section to spend a few words about the philosophical implications of our technical
results, having in view the traditional background of the substantivalism/relationism debate
as well as the recent debate on structural realism. It will be seen that such implications
instantiate a peculiar holistic and structuralist view of the general-relativistic space-time
that we propose to call ”point-structuralism”.
Concerning the Hole Argument, our analysis of the correspondence between symmetries
of the Lagrangian configurational approach and those of the Hamiltonian formulation has
shown the following. Solutions of Einstein’s equations that, in the configurational approach,
differ within the Hole by elements of the subset ADiff
′
M4, which correspond to map-
pings among gauge-equivalent Cauchy data, belong to the same 4-geometry, i.e. the same
equivalence class generated by applying all passive diffeomorphisms to any of the original 4-
metrics: 4Geom = 4Riem/PDiff M
4 = 4Riem/Q′. In this case, as seen at the Hamiltonian
level, they are simply solutions differing by a harmless Hamiltonian gauge transformation
on shell and describing, therefore, the same Einstein ”universe”. Furthermore, it is possi-
ble to engender these allegedly different solutions corresponding to the same ”universe”, by
appropriate choices of the initial gauge fixing (the functions Zˆ [A]). Since we know that the
physical role of the gauge-fixings is essentially that of choosing the functional form of the in-
ertial potentials in the NIF defined by the complete gauge (the epistemic part of the game),
the ”differences” among the solutions generated within the Hole by the allowed active dif-
feomorphisms amount to the different appearances of the intrinsic gravitational phenomena
(the ontic part of the game) in different NIFs. In the end this is what, physically, Leibniz
equivalence reduces to.
As already anticipated, our analysis contrasts with Stachel’s attitude about the Hole
Argument. Leaving aside Stachel’s broad perspective about the significance and the pos-
sibility of generalizations of the Hole story (see Stachel & Iftime, 2005), let us confine
ourselves to few comments about the original Stachel’s proposal for the physical individu-
ation of points of M4 by means of a fully covariant exploitation of the Bergmann-Komar
invariants Iˆ [A]
[
wT [g(x), ∂g(x)]
]
, A = 0, 1, 2, 3. First of all, remember again that the effect
of the Hole Argument reveals itself on solutions of Einstein equations and that the active
diffeomorphisms that purportedly maintain the physical identity of the points are, therefore,
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dynamical symmetries. Now, how are we guaranteed that the functional dependence of the
quantities Iˆ [A]
[
wT [g(x), ∂g(x)]
]
be concretely characterized as relating to actual solutions
of Einstein’s equations ? Since in the actual case we know that these quantities depend
upon 4 Dirac observables and 8 gauge viduate a solution, it follows that this arbitrariness
unavoidably transfers itself on the individuation procedure and leaves it undefined. Indeed,
speaking of general covariance in an abstract way hides the necessity of getting rid of the
above arbitrariness by a gauge-fixing that, in turn, necessarily breaks general covariance.
In other words a definite individuation entails a concrete characterization of the epistemic
part of the game, which is precisely what we have done. The result is, in particular, exactly
what Stachel’s suggestion was intended to, for our intrinsic gauge shows that active diffeo-
morphisms of the first kind (i.e., those belonging to Q′ in their passive interpretation) do
map individuations of point-events into physically equivalent individuations. Indeed, since
the on-shell Hamiltonian gauge transformation connecting two different gauges is the pas-
sive counterpart in Q′ of an active diffeomorphisms DA ∈ ADiff
′
M4, it determines the
drag-along coordinate transformation TDA of Section II connecting the radar 4-coordinates
of the two gauges, i.e., the dual view of the active diffeomorphism. While the active dif-
feomorphism carries-along the identity of points by assumption, its passive view attributes
different physically-individuated radar-coordinates to the same (mathematical) point. It is
seen, therefore, that for any point-event a given individuation by means of Dirac observables
is mapped into a physically-equivalent, NIF-dependent individuation32.
As already noted, it’s worth stressing again that the main reason why we succeeded in
carrying out a concrete realization of Stachel’s original suggestion to its natural end lies
in the possibility that the Hamiltonian method offers of working off-shell. In fact, the
4-D active diffeomorphisms, qua dynamical symmetries of Einstein’s equations, must act
on solutions at every stage of the procedure and fail to display the arbitrary epistemic
part of the scalar invariants. On the other hand, the Hamiltonian separation of the gauge
variables (characterizing the NIF and ruling the generalized inertial effects), from the Dirac
observables (characterizing tidal effects) is an off-shell procedure that brings the wanted
metrical fingerprint by working independently of the initial value problem. Once again, this
mechanism is a typical consequence of the special role played by gauge variables in GR33.
32 Note that even the description of two intersecting world-lines - realizing a point-coincidence - is NIF-
dependent !
33 We noted already that, according to a main conjecture advanced elsewhere (Lusanna & Pauri, 2004a,
2004b), a canonical basis should exist having an explicit scalar character. An evaluation of the degrees
of freedom in connection with the Newman-Penrose formalism for tetrad gravity (Stewart, 1993) tends to
corroborate the conjecture. In the Newman-Penrose formalism we can define ten coordinate-independent
quantities, namely the ten Weyl scalars. If we add ten further scalars built using the extrinsic curvature,
we have a total of twenty scalars from which one should extract a canonical basis replacing the 4-metric
and its conjugate momenta. Consequently, it should be possible to find scalar Dirac observables [the
Bergmann observables, see Lusanna & Pauri, 2004b] and scalar gauge variables (were the task of finding
a canonical basis of scalars too difficult, a minimal requirement would be to characterize a well-defined
family of scalars closing an algebra under Poisson Brackets). Then, the individuating functions of (5.3)
would depend on scalars only and the distinction between Dirac and gauge observables would become
fully invariant. Yet, the gauge-fixing procedure would always break general covariance and one should
not forget, furthermore, that the concept of radar-coordinates contains a built-in frame-dependence (see
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Concerning the physical individuation of point-events, what we got in Section V is tanta-
mount to claiming that the physical role of the gravitational field without matter is exactly
that of individuating physically the points of M4 as point-events, by means of the four inde-
pendent phase-space degrees of freedom. As pointed out above, the mathematical structure
of the canonical transformation that separates the Dirac observables from the gauge vari-
ables is such that the Dirac observables are highly non-local functionals of the metric and
the extrinsic curvature over the whole (off-shell) hyper-surface Στ . The same is clearly true
for the intrinsic pseudo-coordinates [see Eq.(5.3)]. Since the extrinsic curvature has to do
with the embedding of the hyper-surface inM4, the Dirac observables do involve geometrical
elements external to the Cauchy hyper-surface itself. Furthermore, since the temporal gauge
(fixed by the scalar Z [0]), refers to a continuous interval of hyper-surfaces, the gauge-fixing
identity itself is intrinsically four-dimensional.
At this point we could even say that the existence of physical point-events in our models
of general relativity appears to be synonymous with the existence of the Dirac observables
for the gravitational field. We advance accordingly the ontological claim that - physically
- Einstein’s vacuum space-time in our models is literally identifiable with the autonomous
degrees of freedom of such a structural field, while the specific (NIF-dependent) functional
form of the intrinsic pseudo-coordinates associates such coordinates to the points ofM4. The
intrinsic gravitational degrees of freedom are - as it were - fully absorbed in the individuation
of point-events. On the other hand, when matter is present, the individuation methodology
maintains its validity and shows how matter comes to influence the physical individuation
of point-events.
We would like to surmise that the disclosure of the superfluous structure hidden behind
the Leibniz equivalence by means of the physical individuation of point-events, renders even
more glaring the ontological diversity of the gravitational field with respect to all other fields,
even beyond its prominent causal role. It seems substantially difficult to reconcile the nature
of the gravitational field with the standard approach of theories based on a background space-
time (to wit, string theory and perturbative quantum gravity in general). Any attempt at
linearizing such theories unavoidably leads to looking at gravity from the perspective of a
spin-2 theory in which the graviton stands at the same ontological level as other quanta.
In the standard approach of background-dependent theories of gravity, photons, gluons and
gravitons all live on the stage on an equal footing. From the point of view set forth in this
paper, however, non-linear gravitons are at the same time both the stage and the actors
within the causal play of photons, gluons, and other material characters such as electrons
and quarks.
Finally, let us remark that the class of spatially non-compact models treated in this pa-
per, even if not yet able to describe cosmology 34, has been priviliged by taking into primary
consideration the fundamental issue of how to incorporate particle physics in GR, at the
classical level to start with. Classical string theories and super-gravity theories include par-
ticles, but their quantization requires the introduction of a background space-time to define
Section IV). Finally, the energy density EADM (τ, ~σ) would remain a NIF-dependent quantity anyway.
34 Let us stress in this connection that in spatially compact cosmologies the use of particle physics (essentially
defined in non-compact space-times) for the description of the, e.g., nucleosynthesis implies an huge
extrapolation. Basically, it is well-known that at the level of quantum field theory in background curved
space-times, a useful particle interpretation of states does not, in general, even exist.
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the particle Fock space. On the other hand the only well developed form of background-
independent quantum gravity (loop quantum gravity), obtained by quantizing either the
connection or the loop representation of GR, leads to a quantum formulation inequivalent
to Fock space, so that till now it is not known how to incorporate particle physics. We hope
that our viewpoint, taking into account the non-inertial aspects of GR, can be developed
to the extent to be able to reopen the program of canonical quantization of gravity in a
background independent way by quantizing the Dirac observables only35. Note finally that
the individuating relation (5.5) is a numerical identity that has a built-in non-commutative
structure, deriving from the Dirac–Poisson structure hidden in its right-hand side. The in-
dividuation procedure transfers, as it were, the non-commutative Poisson-Dirac structure
of the Dirac observables onto the individuated point-events, even though the coordinates
on the l.h.s. of the identity are c-number quantities. One could guess that such a feature
might deserve some attention in view of quantization, for instance by maintaining that the
identity, interpreted as a relation connecting mean values, could still play some role at the
quantum level.
A further interesting suggestion comes from the following passage of Bergmann and Ko-
mar:
[...] in general relativity the identity of a world point is not preserved under the theory’s widest
invariance group. This assertion forms the basis for the conjecture that some physical theory
of the future may teach us how to dispense with world points as the ultimate constituents of
space-time altogether. (Bergmann & Komar, 1972, 27)
Indeed, would it be possible to build a fundamental theory that is grounded in the reduced
phase space Ω˜4 of the abstract gauge-invariant Dirac observables? This would be an ab-
stract and highly non-local theory of classical gravitation that, transparency aside, would be
stripped of all the epistemic machinery (the gauge freedom) which is indispensable for an
empirical access to the theory. For any given Einstein’s ”universe” with its topology, the
abstract Dirac fields in Ω˜4 are locally functions of the points x of an abstract mathemati-
cal manifold M˜4 that is the equivalence class of all our concrete realizations of space-time,
each one equipped with its gauge-dependent individuation of points, NIF and inertial forces.
Such fields must be called intrinsic to the extent that they are no longer NIF-dependent, and
synthesize, as it were, the essential properties of all the appearances shown by the gauges.
Admittedly, the global existence of Ω˜4 over M˜4 is subjected to a huge set of mathematical
hypotheses which we will not take into account here. Locally, however, the Dirac fields cer-
tainly exist and we could introduce a coordinate system defined by their values as intrinsic
individuating system for the given ”universe”.
Let us stress that, once Einstein’s equations have been solved, the metric tensor and all
of its derived quantities, in particular the light-cone structure, can be re-expressed in terms
of Dirac observables in a gauge-fixed functional form. Yet, if we look at the reduction pro-
cedure the other way around, we could imagine starting with a given choice of initial values
for the Dirac observables (i.e., the germ of a ”universe”), and adding all the required gauge
variables as suitable independent variables, so as to obtain at the end a space-time expres-
sion for the local field gµν(x). Since the relation between all tensor expressions and Dirac
35 See Alba & Lusanna, 2005b, for a preliminary attempt to define relativistic and non-relativistic quantum
mechanics in non-inertial frames in Galilei and Minkowski space-times, respectively.
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observables depends on the gauge, the gauge freedom would represent also the flexibility
of the final local description of the deep non-local structure of the theory, a local descrip-
tion that supports the empirical access to the theory. In other words the gauge structure
could be seen as playing a crucial role in the re-construction of the concrete spatiotempo-
ral continuum representation from a non-local structure. We see, therefore, that even in
the context of classical gravitational theory, the spatiotemporal continuum plays the role of
an epistemic precondition of our sensible experience of macroscopic objects, playing a role
which is not too dissimilar from that enacted by Minkowski micro-space-time in the local
relativistic quantum field theory (see Pauri, 2000). We believe that, from the philosophical
point of view, one could recognize much more substance here than what could appear prima
facie a simple instantiation of the relationship between canonical structure and locality that
pervades contemporary theoretical physics.
Finally, can this basic freedom in the choice of the local realizations be equated with a
“taking away from space and time the last remnant of physical objectivity,” as Einstein
suggested? We believe that, discounting Einstein’s “spatial obsession” with realism as lo-
cality (and separability), a significant kind of spatio-temporal objectivity survives. It is true
that the functional form of the Dirac observables is NIF-dependent; yet, even leaving aside
the role of the abstract phase space Ω˜4, there is no a-priori physical individuation of the
manifold points independently of the metric field, so we cannot say that the individuation
procedures corresponding to different gauges individuate different point-events (see footnote
32). A really different physical individuation should only be attributed to different initial
conditions for the Dirac observables, (i.e., to a different ”universe”). We can, therefore,
say that general covariance represents the horizon of a priori possibilities for the physical
appearance of space-time, possibilities that must be actualized within any given solution of
the dynamical equations in terms of NIFs.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS - II: AN INSTANTIATION OF STRUCTURAL
REALISM AS ”POINT-STRUCTURALISM
.
We conclude spending a few words about the implications of our results for some issues
surrounding the recent debate on scientific structural realism, as well as for the traditional
debate on the absolutist/relationist dichotomy.
As well-known, the term scientific realism has been interpreted in a number of different
ways within the literature on philosophy of science, in connection with the progressive so-
phistication of our understanding of scientific knowledge. Such ways concern, e.g., realism
about observable or unobservable entities, and realism about theories. A further ramifi-
cations of meanings has been introduced more recently by the so called structural realism
(the only attainable reality are relations between (unobservable) objects), which originated
a division between the so-called epistemic structural realists (entity realism is unwarranted)
and the ontic structural realists (the relations exhaust what exists), (see Simon, 2003).
From the logical point of view, we can assume that the concept of structure refers to
a (stable or not) set of relations among a set of some kind of constituents that are put in
relations (the relata). The specification expressed by the notion of structural realism intro-
duces some kind of ontological distinction between the role of the relations and that of the
constituents. At least two main exemplary possibilities present themselves as obvious: (i)
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there are relations, in which the constituents are (ontologically) primary and the relation
secondary; (ii) there are relations, in which the relation is (ontologically) primary while the
constituents are secondary, and this even without any prejudice about the ultimate onto-
logical consistency of the constituents. In the case of physical entities, one could cautiously
recover in this connection the traditional distinction between essential and non-essential
properties (accidents) in order to characterize the degree of (ontological) primacy of the re-
lations versus the relata and vice versa (and this independently of any metaphysical flavor
possibly connected to the above distinctions). For example, one could say that in the ex-
treme case (i) only accidental properties of the constituents can depend upon the relational
structure, while in the extreme case (ii) at least one essential property of the constituents
depends upon the relational structure (saying that all the essential properties of the relata
depend upon the relation would be tantamount to claiming that there exist only relations
without constituents, as the ontic structural realist has it).
A further complication is connected to the nature of the structure we are considering.
For while at the logical level (leaving aside the deep philosophical issue concerning the
relationships between mathematical structures and substances) the concept of mathematical
structure (e.g. a system of differential equations, or even the bare mathematical manifold of
point which provides the first layer of our representations of the real space-time ) can be taken
to be sufficiently clear for our purposes, the definition of physical structure raises existential
philosophical problems immediately. For example, we believe that it is very difficult to
define a physical structure without bringing in its constituents, and thereby granting them
some kind of existence and defending some sort of (entity realism). Analogously, we believe
that it is very difficult to defend structural realism without also endorsing a theory realism
of some sort. However, both theses are not universally shared.
Having said this, let us come back to the results we have obtained in the previous Sec-
tions. The analysis based on our intrinsic gauge has disclosed a remarkable and rich local
structure of the general-relativistic space-time for the considered models of GR. In corre-
spondence to every intrinsic gauge (5.5) we found a gauge-related physical individuation of
point-events in terms of the Dirac observables of that gauge, i.e., in terms of the ontic part
of the gravitational field, as represented in the clothes furnished by the gauge (by the NIF).
Moreover, since the gauge-fixing identity (5.5) is four-dimensional we have an instantiation
of metrical holism which, though local in the temporal dimension and characterized by a
dynamical stratification in 3-hyper surfaces, is four-dimensional.
At this point we can assert that we have a kind of ontology in which the identity of
point-events is conferred upon them by a complex relational structure in which they are
holistically enmeshed. This relational structure includes all the elements of the complete
gauge fixing Γ8, summarized by a NIF, and supported by a definite solution of Einstein’s
equations throughout M4, corresponding to given initial values for the Dirac observables
in that gauge (a definite Einstein ”universe”). The identity of point-events, at this level,
should be properly termed as gauge-objective.
It seems, therefore, that we have disclosed a holistic structure which is clearly ontolog-
ically prior to its constituents, as to their physical identity, even if we cannot agree with
Cao’s assertion (see Cao, 2003, p.111) that the constituents, as mere place-holders, derive
their meaning or even their existence from their function and place in the structure. In-
deed, at any level of consideration of GR, the practical level above all, one cannot avoid
26
quantifying over points, and we have just attributed a physical meaning36 to our radar-
coordinate indexing of such points which makes point-events as ontologically equivalent to
the existence of the gravitational field as an extended entity. Quite in general, we cannot
see how a place-holder can have any ontological function in an evolving network of relation-
ships without possessing at least some kind of properties. Even more, let us recover our
previous claim that - physically - Einstein’s vacuum space-time in our models is literally
identifiable with the autonomous degrees of freedom of the gravitational field in vacuum, and
moreover that the intrinsic gravitational degrees of freedom are - as it were - fully absorbed
in the individuation of point-events. Both conclusions do in fact confer a sort of causal
power to the gravitationally-dressed points. Then, we can ask whether all has already been
said concerning the identity of points or whether instead some kind of intrinsic individuality
survives beneath the variety of descriptions displayed by all the gauge-related NIFs, and
common to all these appearances. For indeed this kind of intrinsic identity is just furnished
by the abstract Dirac fields residing within the phase-space Ω˜4, which is nothing else that a
quotient with respect to all of the concrete realizations and appearances of the NIFs. Ac-
cepting this view, we are led to a peculiar space-time structure in which the relation/relata
correspondence does not fit with any of the extreme cases listed above, for one could assert
that while the abstract essential properties belong to the constituents as seen in Ω˜4 (so that
abstract point-events in M4 would be like - as it were - to natural kinds), the totality of
the physically concrete accidents are displayed by means of the holistic relational structure.
This is the reason why we are proposing to call this peculiar kind of space-time structuralism
as point-structuralism.
Summarizing, this view holds that space-time point-events (the relata) do exist as indi-
viduals and we continue to quantify over them; however, their properties can be viewed both
as extrinsic and relational, being conferred on them in a holistic way by the whole structure
of the metric field and the extrinsic curvature on a simultaneity hyper-surface, and, at the
same time as intrinsic, being coincident with the autonomous degrees of freedom of the
gravitational field represented by the abstract NIF-independent Dirac fields in Ω˜4. In this
way both the metric field and the point-events maintain their own manner of existence, so
that the structural texture of space-time in our models does not force us to abandon an
entity realist stance about both the metric field and its points. We must, therefore, refute
the thesis according to which metrical relations can exist without their constituents (the
point-events).
Concerning the traditional debate on the dichotomy substantivalism/relationism, we be-
lieve that our analysis - as a case study limited to the class of space-times dealt with - may
offer a tertium-quid solution to the debate by overcoming it. First of all, let us recall that,
in remarkable diversity with respect to the traditional historical presentation of Newton’s
absolutism vis a´ vis Leibniz’s relationism, Newton had a much deeper understanding of the
nature of space and time. In two well-known passages of De Gravitatione, Newton expounds
what could be defined an original proto-structuralist view of space-time (see also Torretti
(1987), and DiSalle (1994)). He writes (our emphasis):
Perhaps now it is maybe expected that I should define extension as substance or accident or
else nothing at all. But by no means, for it has its own manner of existence which fits neither
36 Even operationally, in principle (see Pauri & Vallisneri, 2002; Lusanna & Pauri, 2004a, 2004b, already
quoted in Section V).
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substance nor accidents [. . . ] The parts of space derive their character from their positions, so
that if any two could change their positions, they would change their character at the same
time and each would be converted numerically into the other qua individuals. The parts of
duration and space are only understood to be the same as they really are because of their
mutual order and positions (propter solum ordinem et positiones inter se); nor do they have
any other principle of individuation besides this order and position which consequently cannot
be altered. (Hall & Hall, 1962, p.99, p.103.)
:
On the other hand, in his relationist arguments, Leibniz could exploit the principle of suffi-
cient reason because Newtonian space was uniform, as the following passage lucidly explains
(our emphasis):
Space being uniform, there can be neither any external nor internal reason, by which to
distinguish its parts, and to make any choice between them. For, any external reason to
discern between them, can only be grounded upon some internal one. Otherwise we should
discern what is indiscernible, or choose without discerning. (Alexander (1956), p.39).
Clearly, if the parts of space were real, the Principle of Sufficient Reason would be violated.
Therefore, for Leibniz, space is not real. The upshot, however, is that space (space-time)
in general relativity far from being uniform may possess, as we have seen, a rich structure.
This is just the reason why - in our sense - it is real, and why Leibniz equivalence called upon
for general relativity happens to hide the very nature of space-time, instead of disclosing it.
In conclusion, what emerges from our analysis is a kind of new structuralist conception
of space-time. Such new structuralism is not only richer than that of Newton, as it could be
expected because of the dynamical structure of Einstein space-time, but richer in an even
deeper sense. For this new structuralist conception turns out to include elements common to
the tradition of both substantivalism (space, and space points, have an autonomous existence
independently of other bodies or matter fields) and relationism (the physical meaning of
space depends upon the relations between bodies or, in modern language, the specific reality
of space depends (also) upon the (matter) fields it contains).
We have seen that the points of general-relativistic space-times, quite unlike the points of
the homogeneous Newtonian space, are endowed with a remarkably rich non-point-like and
holistic structure furnished by the metric field and its derivatives. Therefore, the indepen-
dent degrees of freedom of the metric field are able to characterize the ”mutual order and
positions” of points dynamically, since - as it were - each point-event ”is” the ”values” of the
intrinsic degrees of freedom of the gravitational field. This capacity is even stronger, since
such mutual order is altered by the presence of matter. On the other hand, even though the
metric field does not embody the traditional notion of substance, it exists and plays a role
for the individuation of point-events by means of its structure. On the other hand, although
one can maintain also the view that the physical properties are conferred to the point-events
in a peculiar relational form, our point-structuralism does not support even the standard
relationist view. In fact, the holistic relationism we defend does not reduce the whole of
spatiotemporal relations to physical relations (i.e. it is not eliminativist), nor it entails that
space-time does not exist as such, being reducible to physical relations. It supports a thesis
about the nature of identity of point-events we continue to quantify over. These are individ-
uals in a peculiar sense: they exist as autonomous constituents, but one cannot claim that
their properties do not depend on the properties of others. Not only relations do exist, but
also the carriers of them, even if they do bring intrinsic properties in a very special sense.
28
We acknowledge that the validity of at least three of our results is restricted to the class
of models of GR we worked with. Yet, we were interested in exemplifying a question of
principle, so that we can claim that there is a class of models of GR embodying both a real
notion of NIF-dependent temporal change, a NIF-dependent physical individuation of points
and a new structuralist and holistic view of space-time.
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